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ABSTRACT 
Denis Goulet (1931-2006) was a pioneer of human development theory and 
the main founder of work on “development ethics” as a self-conscious field 
that, by his definition, treats the ethical and value questions posed by 
development theory, planning, and practice. The paper looks at aspects of 
Goulet’s work in relation to four issues concerning the project of development 
ethics—[1] scope, [2] methodology, [3] roles, [4] organisational format and 
identity. It compares his views with subsequent trends in the field and suggests 
lessons for work on human development. [1] Goulet’s definition of the scope of 
development ethics remains serviceable and allows us to combine a view of it as 
social change ethics (including global change ethics) with yet a relatively specific 
primary audience of those who recognize themselves as working in development 
studies or development policy. [2] His approach in development ethics espoused 
intense existential immersion in each context and was often deeply illuminating, 
but was limited by the time and skills it requires and its relative disconnection 
from communicable theory. [3] Goulet wrote profoundly about ethics’ possible 
lines of influence, through prophetic force and more routinely through 
incorporation in methods, movements, and education. His own ideas did not 
become sufficiently embodied in methods and methodologies, but some have 
become so thanks to other authors. [4] Goulet saw development ethics as a 
new discipline or subdiscipline. However the required types of immersion, in 
particular contexts and/or in understanding and changing the methods and 
systems that structure routine practice, have to be undertaken by people 
coming from and remaining close to diverse disciplinary and professional 
backgrounds. Development ethics is and has to be, he gradually came to 
accept, not a distinct subdiscipline but an interdisciplinary field. 
Keywords 
development ethics, Denis Goulet, human development, interdisciplinarity 
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DENIS GOULET AND THE PROJECT  
OF DEVELOPMENT ETHICS: 
Choices in Methodology, Focus and Organization 
DENIS GOULET, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE PROJECT OF 
DEVELOPMENT ETHICS 
‘[W]hat kind of development can be considered “human”?’ asked the American 
philosopher, anthropologist and social planner Denis Goulet (1971: 236). 
Already in 1960 he wrote that ‘development’ means ‘changes which allow 
human beings, both as individual persons and as members of groups, to move 
from one condition of life to one which is more human in some meaningful 
way’ (1960: 14). His 1971 book The Cruel Choice declared: ‘The aim of this work 
is to thrust debates over economic and social development into the arena of 
ethical values. … Is human development something more than a systemic 
combination of modern bureaucracy, efficient technology, and productive 
economy?’ (1971: vii). Development’s ‘ultimate goals are those of existence 
itself: to provide all men with the opportunity to lead full human lives’ (1971: 
x). He presented an ideal of ‘full, comprehensive human development’ (1979: 
105), and praised the Sri Lankan Sarvodaya movement’s ‘concept of human 
development …[based on] respect for all life and the concept of the well-being 
of all’ (1979: 109). 
Denis Goulet (1931-2006) brought the French language project of “the 
ethics of development” into the Spanish, Portuguese, and English language 
literatures and led this work for a generation. The term development ethics had 
emerged in the mid-20th century in work led by the French socio-economist 
Louis-Joseph Lebret (1897-1966), founder in 1941 of the research centre 
Économie et Humanisme. Lebret worked extensively on a humanistic approach to 
national and international development. He ‘never tired of quoting with 
approval the phrase coined by Francois Perroux’, his colleague, that 
development is for ‘every person and the whole person’ (‘tous les hommes et tout 
l’homme’) (Goulet 2006a: 58; 2000: 34). Economic might must not be equated to 
societal right (Goule 2006a: 4). 
Goulet became Lebret’s student and protégé. After a training in 
philosophy and theology he spent one and a half years in religious 
communities that lived with poor and marginal groups in France, Spain, and 
Algeria, during 1957-58. He then studied and worked with the Économie et 
Humanisme group for three years in Paris and Lebanon. Lebret led him to 
‘define my life’s work to become a development ethicist operating in its several 
registers—theory, analysis, pedagogy, planning, and field practice’ (Goulet 
2006a: xxxi). 
In 1960 Goulet published “Pour une éthique moderne du 
développement”, a manifesto for “a practical ethics of development” (Goulet 
1960: 12) that would transcend the rupture between utopian normative 
political theory that was not grounded in real life and predictive theory that had 
no interest in ethics. It should attend to the full development of persons (1960: 
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23) and not conflate the concepts of “goods” and “good”, or “having” and 
“being” (a contrast stressed by Lebret among others); and give balanced 
attention to the responsibilities of each of “governments, private investors, 
owners and labour unions” in relation to the development of all of a country 
and of all countries (1960: 12).  
Goulet spent four years in Brazil in the early 1960s, undertaking doctoral 
research followed by technical cooperation work. His first book, Etica Del 
Desarrollo, appeared in 1965 in Spanish and in 1966 in Portuguese (Etica Do 
Desenvolvimento). Subsequently he did field research also in southern Spain, 
Guinea-Bissau, Sri Lanka, Mexico, and again Brazil, and worked too in Poland 
(Goulet 1992a). From 1979 to 2006 he was Professor of Education for Justice 
in the Department of Economics at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana, 
a charismatic voice who bridged disciplinary and theory-practice gaps. His 
most influential work, The Cruel Choice (1971a), prefigured much later 
development thinking, including current themes of human security. Its core 
concepts were “existence rationality” and vulnerability (1971a: viii); chapter 
two was entitled ‘Vulnerability: the key to understanding and promoting 
development’. Goulet concluded that: “Every person and society wants to be 
treated by others as a being of worth, for its own sake and on its own terms, 
regardless of its utility or attractiveness to others” (Goulet 1975: 232). He 
proffered a ‘general lesson’: ‘every society must feel that its values are worthy 
of respect if it is to embark on an uncertain future with confidence in its own 
ability to control that future’ (1971a: 49).  
In a publishing career of half a century, Goulet did perhaps more than 
anyone to promote a notion of development ethics as a distinctive and 
required area in thought and practice: including in eleven books, such as The 
Uncertain Promise (1977), and Development Ethics (1995), and over 160 papers, 
including work on methods of participation and action research, technology 
transfer, and incentives and indicators. A selection of his lifetime’s writings has 
appeared as Development Ethics at Work: Explorations 1960-2002 (Goulet, 2006a). 
Many papers are available on-line at http://www.nd.edu/~dgoulet.  
It is worth looking back at Goulet’s career, to identify questions and 
possible lessons for the work on human development and capabilities led by 
Sen, Haq and Nussbaum. Well before them, he advocated that “authentic 
development aims toward the realization of human capabilities in all spheres” 
(Goulet 1971b: 205), and stressed that economic growth and technological 
modernity must be treated as, at best, potential means towards considered 
human values, not vice versa. At the same time he insisted that principles of 
ethics and religion had to be confronted by and relate to the full realities and 
complexities of modern economies (Goulet 1960: 23).  
We will look at four issues concerning Goulet’s project of ‘development 
ethics’:  
1. its scope; does it cover too much, and thereby nothing in depth? 
2. methodology for such work 
3. its roles; has it any realistic lines of influence, and on whom? 
4. its organisational format and identity, which should reflect considered 
stances on scope, methodology and roles. 
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THE SCOPE AND CHARACTER OF DEVELOPMENT ETHICS 
Development ethics as a body of work arose in the historical context of the 
gradual emergence of capacities to ensure, for example, clean water and 
essential drugs for everyone but the absence as yet of a working system of 
rights and responsibilities that will fulfil those possibilities. Two aspects 
deserve underlining: its global frame of reference and its focus on specific local 
realities, with an expectation of difference as well as an interest in 
commonality. Together these features make definition of a distinct field more 
difficult. 
Development ethics starts from the inequalities and relationships within 
our world and within its parts. It deals explicitly with contexts in which 
markedly, even dramatically, different ethics coexist, and examines that 
coexistence. Mwanahewa, for example, proposes from his study of the 
concepts and causes of corruption in Uganda that, while much of the analysis 
internationally of corruption has had a generalised, universalist character, “it 
remains evident that the aspect of context, namely the meeting of the modern 
conventional and traditional, needs to be tackled”; “We can no longer afford to 
look at aspects of corruption and bribery as if the human race was one 
homogeneous lot.” (Mwanahewa 2006: 17). Goulet applied a similar principle, 
in an anthropological style that looks at real cultural and historical settings not 
some supposedly timeless “everywhere”. This context-specificity and the 
resultant comparative dimension are characteristic features in development 
ethics, even if not universal in nor unique to it. 
In outlining an aspirant or emergent field or sub-field, one seeks to specify a 
scope which has a good theoretical rationale and at the same time finds a 
sufficient, interested audience. A field must be sufficiently distinctive and 
rewarding that enough people will listen and engage with it and continue to 
engage despite their limited time and the many competitors for their attention. 
The rationale of development studies in general is that social, political, 
economic, medical and environmental change are fundamentally 
interconnected; and that the interconnections demand close attention for they 
bring enormous threats and opportunities for humankind. Correspondingly, 
development is intensely ethically-laden - who benefits or loses, with respect to 
whose values; who decides, who is consulted, who is not? Development ethics 
is an untidily bounded subject about untidy and often unpleasant realities.  
Goulet suggested that development ethics considers the “ethical and value 
questions posed by development theory, planning and practice” (1977: 5). Its 
mission, he proposed, is “to diagnose value conflicts, to assess policies (actual and 
possible), and to validate or refute valuations placed on development 
performance” (1997b: 1168). These specifications had a number of implications.  
First, as a field of practical ethics, development ethics should be grounded 
in intense observation of varied experience, not only the world-views of the 
powerful. Its normative discourses should be well related to empirical ones. 
Second, the definition depends in turn on one’s definition of development. 
This can be an advantage: it means the definition can accommodate different 
views. Alternative bounds for development ethics include (each to be qualified by 
the Goulet definition): (i) “the South”; (ii) the South plus North-South relations; 
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(iii) all nations (we then have “social progress ethics”); (iv) global relations and 
global issues, not only inter-national ones; etc. Over time the case for broader 
bounds has steadily strengthened. Goulet always followed it, as does current work 
on human development and capabilities. In a densely interconnected globe, where 
the quality and sustainability of the North’s “development” are also profoundly in 
question, there is strong logic in moving development ethics’s bounds to social 
progress ethics in all nations and their interrelations, yet also some danger of 
losing a focus and an audience, and of losing a priority to the poorest. 
However, thirdly, development ethics so conceived can at the same time still 
speak especially to relatively definite audiences that self-identify as development 
academics, funders, planners and practitioners, and their major clients, including 
students, rather than attempt to speak to everybody and as a result perhaps reach 
nobody. If development ethics tries to cover most of social ethics that could 
result in duplication, lack of focus, and over-abstraction. Nigel Dower presents 
development ethics instead as the field that asks ‘How ought a society to exist 
and move into the future?’, as partner to the traditional field of personal ethics 
that asks ‘How ought one to live as an individual?’, and the emergent field of 
global ethics that asks the first question in terms of world society (Dower 
1988). 
In sum, Goulet’s flexible definition remains serviceable and allows us to 
combine a view of development ethics as social change ethics (and global change 
ethics) with yet a relatively specific primary audience—those who recognize 
themselves as within development studies or development policy—and an 
acceptance that within that audience there are multiple definitions of the bounds 
of “development theory, planning and practice”. One can then have an audience, 
and a global orientation, and not lose a priority to poor people. This has been 
shown, and momentum achieved, in the stream within development ethics that 
centres on ‘human development’, as well as in some of the great river of 
human rights work. Goulet’s own stream of development ethics remained 
small in comparison, for other reasons, which we will consider. 
ON METHODOLOGY: STAGES OF OBSERVATION, THEORY, 
ADVICE, PRACTICE 
Goulet came to his ideas through an ethnographic approach rather than 
centrally through reflection on welfare economics or Western moral 
philosophy. He called for ethical investigation and debate that are driven by 
experience, not primarily based in academic philosophy and pre-set academic 
frameworks; and thus for field-based identification and reflection on values 
and value conflicts and on societal, corporate and global responsibilities. He 
espoused a process-oriented, practice-centered, locality-specific approach not 
an elaborate generalized theoretical model. 
Writing in 1971 just before Rawls’s A Theory of Justice appeared, he declared 
that philosophical ethics had become sterile but also predicted the field’s 
revival. Much however of the revival has failed his test that ethics must start 
from experience, from ‘the marketplace…the factory…the planning board and 
the irrigation project’ (1971a: 11). Contrary to Rawls and the mainstream of 
philosophical ethics he held that ‘Today’s ethicians are forced by reality to 
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renounce pretensions towards “grand theory”’ (1971a: 11). Life is too complex. 
Goulet emphatically advocated ‘practical ethics’ rather than a theoretical ethics 
that would supposedly then be ‘applied’. His vision of development ethics was 
as part of this other stream in the revival of ethics: practical ethics, including 
medical ethics, business ethics, bio-ethics and care ethics. Only a practice-
based development ethics could have adequate ‘regard for constraints, for 
human desires and limitations, and for the unpredictable vagaries of local 
conditions’ (2006a: 105) and avoid becoming entrapped in oversimple 
conceptual schemata (2006a: Ch.10). 
Goulet’s conception of development ethics, like that of Lebret or Peter 
Berger (1974), included strong attention to descriptive and explanatory ethics, 
to be done with more attention to dynamics than colonial ethnography had 
given. Development ethics must start, he said, from study of how people in a 
given setting think and seek to make sense of the world and their lives and the 
forces and choices that face them. To grasp this ‘existence rationality’ is 
essential if one is to offer relevant advice and not merely enunciate grand 
ideals. “Any ethic—of development, of social practice, or of cultural 
reconstruction—is simultaneously an ethic of goals and a ‘means of the 
means.’ No extrinsic grafting of norms can truly work: norms must be drawn 
from the inner dynamisms of each arena in which they operate. At stake is the 
difference between hollow moralism and genuine ethical strategies.” (Goulet 
1976: 40).  
This descriptive and explanatory ethics, essential for serious ethically 
based strategy, requires a particular sort of research methodology, argued 
Goulet (1971a). He developed an approach from the French researcher 
Georges Allo for “integrating the living experience of ordinary people with 
philosophical investigation and empirical social science research” (Goulet 
1992b: 19).1 For “in the case of values, the ‘object’ studied has no intelligibility 
apart from its ‘subjective’ resonances. …. [Further,] Values belong to realms of 
synthesis, not analysis: their proper domains are philosophy, poetry, meta-
analytical symbolism. Only under stringent conditions…is the study of values 
appropriate to social science. To reduce this synthesis of totality to that mere 
portion of reality which is measurable is to deprive life of its specificity and to 
falsify reality itself.” (Goulet 1971b: 208).  
Ethnographic attention shows up the unrealism of narrowly defined forms 
of ‘realism’ found in various analyses in development economics, international 
relations and related policy studies. Let us take two examples, corruption in the 
South and consumption in the North.  
An ethnographically grounded descriptive development ethics takes us 
further than theories that look only at a grasping ‘economic man’ facing a set 
of opportunities for personal gain. Those have been applied with limited 
success in much contemporary analysis of corruption (e.g. Klitgaard 1988). 
Goulet held that exposure to the modernising powers of Europe and North 
America had disrupted an “equilibrium of desire” in pre-modern societies, of 
not wanting and craving what is not widely attainable. Demonstration effects 
“remove[d] curbs on desire before providing individuals with the means to 
expand resources” (Goulet 1997a: 493). This would not by itself explain 
corruption. What must also have been removed are the constraints set by 
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proscriptions concerning acceptable means and other inhibitions to the pursuit 
of maximum desire fulfilment. 
A second line of explanation therefore posits the felt strangeness of the 
public sphere in a new larger-scale society marked still by strong family and 
small-scale communal loyalties; the weakness as yet of new identities of 
professional and citizen; and weakly evolved corresponding peer groups, 
organisations and belief systems. Goulet argued that more complex societies 
operate a division between social spheres, a meta-principle that different 
principles apply in different spheres—for example, that “something for 
something” is an exchange principle that must not be applied within the state. 
He suggested this division might not be easily adopted by simpler societies. 
Men learn to conduct their business life as though money were the supreme 
value, while continuing to abide by other values in their private lives. Such 
normative schizophrenia creates great personal stress, it is true. But it has at least 
protected modern societies from bearing the full consequences of the values to 
which they subscribe in the realm of productive activity. Non-modern societies, on the 
other hand, are not psychologically prepared to dissociate economic values from more intimate 
value spheres. If economic achievement is portrayed to them as important enough 
to warrant casting off all other concerns—including their most treasured family 
and religious practices—then why should their quest for more goods be 
moderated by considerations of the rights of others, prior claims of needier men, 
or the need for austerity in consumption so as to build up a solid production base 
in the nation? (Goulet, 1971a: 223-4; italics in the original). 
Societies not steeped in such dissociation could move to a value unitarism 
in which acquisitive and consumerist values become applied comprehensively, 
not only in restricted spheres. Aware more generally of the malleability of 
desires, he stressed the explosive danger of boosting desires in advance of 
productive capacity (1971a, Ch.11), a trap avoided in East Asia but perhaps not 
elsewhere.  
Goulet’s readiness to look at the empirics, not only formal analytics, of 
consumption led him on towards its normative assessment, and to issues 
central to the meaning of development. Like Sen, Goulet observed that people 
in general rank orders of desire, not merely intensities of desire – there are 
different orders of goods, and preferences about desires, not merely 
preferences about goods. He referred to ideas from Aristotle onwards about 
such ranking of types of good; for example Aristotle’s category of ‘honorable 
goods’. People make these rankings for practical purposes, not only from love 
of distinction. Like Nussbaum later, Goulet stressed the need for a normative 
theory of consumption (e.g., 2006a, Chs. 3 & 4). ‘The plenitude of good is not 
proliferation of [economic] goods. … The defense of freedom, in the face of 
the seductive flattery of the myth of happiness [through consumption], is the 
fundamental task of any development ethics which is realistic and effective’ 
(2006a: 34; emphasis in original). He was impressed by the attitude of pity that 
the nomadic groups he had lived with in the 1950s and 60s held toward people 
who are encumbered and dominated by things, by ‘stuff’. 
Goulet employed the same language of freedom as Sen, and likewise 
posited freedom as a universally held value, but he had more substantive 
theories of desire and of freedom. He distinguished ‘freedom from wants’, 
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obtained via the fulfilment of fundamental needs, and ‘freedom for wants’, 
where one is autonomous, in charge of and not slave to the determinants of 
want generation (1971a, Ch.6). In Sen’s system the danger of consumerism is a 
formal possibility not a central concern; in Goulet’s system it is central. Often 
freedom from some constraints is achieved in ways that reduce human 
autonomy (1971a: 126). Restraint of material desires is an essential requirement 
for freedom (pp.121-2), he argued, not only a prudent measure along a path of 
accumulation. ‘Genuine wealth, the [early Fathers of the Christian Church] 
contend, resides in the internal freedom which makes one use material goods 
instrumentally to meet needs, and as a springboard for cultivating those higher 
spiritual goods which alone bring deeper satisfactions: virtue, friendship, truth, 
and beauty’ (Goulet 2006a: 146). There is nothing specifically Christian in such 
claims, which are found in many traditions, and for example in the work of the 
19th century British economist Alfred Marshall, as well as in the accumulated 
results of modern research on well-being. Voicing such claims, in advance of 
and even now after theses research findings, does not ensure popularity or 
attention; many writers prefer to pass by on the other side. The limited impact 
of Goulet’s development ethics relates also though to other factors besides 
voicing unpopular ideas, as we will see. 
Goulet’s policy ethics grew out of the descriptive ethics that he built 
through his methodology of investigation. His model of value systems and 
value change posited an existential core that must be respected and built from, 
and an outer zone of flexibility where adaptation is possible. 
…to build development from tradition is the very opposite of reactionary. … 
Since the will of most Third World communities is anchored in the cultural 
values from which they derive their identity, integrity and sense of life’s meaning, 
there can be no justification for labeling a development strategy founded on the 
latent dynamisms in traditional, indigenous and local value orientations, as 
politically reactionary. On the contrary, the procedural commitment to respect 
values already in place constitutes a solid guarantee against falling in the twin 
traps of elitism and manipulation. To design and build development on tradition 
and indigenous values is to espouse a philosophy of change founded on a basic 
trust in the ability of people, no matter how oppressed or impoverished, to 
improve their lives, to understand the social forces that affect them, and 
eventually to harness these forces to processes of genuine human and societal 
development (Goulet 1987: 176). 
This model for policy ethics is very demanding: the examination in depth 
of a project, programme, policy or even a national development strategy, 
identifying and reflecting on its multifarious value impacts; moving to an 
evaluation only through an in-depth description and attempt at 
understanding—as illustrated in his work on technology transfer, Mexico, 
Guinea-Bissau, Sri Lanka and Brazil. Some work by others is on similar lines, 
even maintained over several years (e.g., Porter et al. 1991, Richards 1985; 
Uphoff 1996). It requires exceptional inputs of sustained and wide-ranging 
attention, and is not readily funded. Mainstream work on value change, such as 
in the World Values Surveys and even on the growth of consumerism or 
individualism, sometimes builds up sustained time series but is done through 
large periodic sample surveys and has a very different character. 
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More work on development policy ethics has been directly normative, 
addressing urgent questions of choice, responsibility and priority, by 
application or extension of frameworks proposed as relevant from 
philosophical ethics. Compared to Goulet’s call for an existentialist 
ethnography, human-rights based approaches for example contain ready-made 
frameworks for observation, monitoring and evaluation and for contributing in 
policy design. They seek to establish principles concerning rights and 
responsibilities, including with transnational application.  
Limitations of Goulet’s type of field ethics, deeply illuminating as it can 
be, concern not just the time and skills it requires, but its relative disconnection 
from communicable theory. Goulet himself inevitably could do less fieldwork 
as he grew older. His mistrust of analytical philosophy that lacked a rich 
experiential base meant that he did not deepen his thinking much further by 
that route. Instead, he increasingly restated his earlier insights rather than 
extend them. What we see in the most interesting development ethics work in 
the past twenty years (e.g., Nussbaum & Glover 1995; Pogge 2002; Gready & 
Ensor 2005), including increasingly in the work presented in the Human 
Development and Capability Association, the International Development 
Ethics Association, et al., are attempts to combine case investigation and 
ethnographic insight with structured philosophical thinking. While in several 
respects Goulet had shown the way, we require also theoretical structures and 
systematic elaboration and ordering, in order to hold together and sustain 
practically-oriented movements. Here Goulet seemed to lack patience. He did 
not undertake further conceptual refinement of notions of freedom. His 
incisive ‘embryonic theory of priority needs’ (1971a: 248) remained embryonic, 
never fully elaborated in relation to ongoing work in psychology and 
philosophy.2 Arguably he sought a different audience, more popular and less 
academic, and different lines of influence. He had indeed a conscious theory of 
the roles of ethics and of his own role. To these we now turn. 
ON INFLUENCE: TEACHING, RESEARCH AND ADVOCACY IN 
ETHICS  
Ethics can play various roles, Goulet observed (1971a, Appendix 1). It has 
evaluative and critical roles in assessing and querying practices; a normative 
role in guiding the use of power and to constrain and coerce action; a role in 
grounding institutions, determining our view of what is normal, and our 
normal view, influencing where we look and how; a role to motivate action and 
‘give exploiters a bad conscience’; and a pedagogical role, to teach critical 
awareness of the moral content of choices, including “as a pedagogy of the 
oppressed in case it is rejected as pedagogy by the oppressors” (1971a: 338). 
Holding that ‘power without legitimacy must ultimately perish’ (p.341), he 
was aware that legitimacy and illegitimacy are not conveyed only through codes 
of ethics, but also through for example tradition and charisma. He had a clear 
vision then of the task facing development ethics, as more than ‘mere 
preachments addressed to the “good will” and generosity of the powerful, and 
to the escapist sentiments of the powerless. It is…in the interstices of power 
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and in the structural relationships binding the weak to the strong that 
development ethics must unfold itself ’ (1971a: 19).  
Following Danilo Dolci, Goulet stressed the primary power of ‘moral 
rather than material considerations’. Successful revolutionary change involves 
‘a new sensitivity, a new capacity, a new culture, new instincts’ (Dolci, cited by 
Goulet 2006a: 25). At the same time Goulet urged that ‘mobilization strategies 
must protect the inner limits of old existence rationalities while expanding their 
outer boundaries’ (1971a: 190), finding and using their ‘latent potential for 
change’ (p.192). His chosen example of such a combination—revolution based 
on traditional identity—was Meiji Japan. Change that does not threaten group 
survival, identity and solidarity may face little resistance (pp.204-5). 
Goulet was concerned thus not only with “The Ethics of Power”—
seeking to instruct and guide the Prince—but with “the Power of Ethics”, its 
force in constraining, motivating, inspiring, reconceiving. For him “politics as 
the art of the possible” covered also politics as the “art of redefining the 
possible” (1971a: 336). He declared that: 
Planners and other intellectuals find it so difficult to create a true professional 
ethic because they are crafters of words, ideas, and models. Consequently, they 
are timid about plunging into the heartland reality of ethics as existential power, 
and not as moral verbalism or conceptualism. Ethicists themselves constantly 
vacillate between ethical paralysis or compromise in the face of power, and 
energetic creativity newly released whenever they catch a faint glimpse of the 
power of ethics itself. … the power of ethics to counter the power of wealth, of 
politics, of bureaucratic inertia, of defeatism, of social pathology. Such power can 
be won by a Gandhi, a Martin Luther King, a Danilo Dolci; it can never be 
institutionalized. But those others who lack ethical grandeur will inevitably lose 
hope in the face of larger powers, and accept compromises which strip their own 
ethics of its latent power. (Goulet 1976: 40-41).  
Unfortunately, inspirational, charismatic leadership can as likely lead in 
bad directions as good. Further, leaders require a combination of a favourable 
conjuncture, capable supporters, strong networks, and relevant practicable 
proposals, in addition to an inspiring vision (Gasper 2007). Influenced by and 
interacting with figures such as Dolci, Fanon, Paulo Freire, Ivan Illich and the 
movement of liberation theology, Goulet’s emphasis on the possible prophetic 
roles of ethics, while valid, may not have provided the best guideline for his 
own work as a potential persuader through the crafting of words, ideas and 
models. He may have become dispirited in the era—one of charismatic 
leadership—of Reaganism, Islamism, born-again Protestantism, the 
suppression of liberation theology and the retreat from Vatican II, and of 
tragedies and disappointments in some countries he had engaged with closely 
such as Algeria, Sri Lanka or Guinea-Bissau.  
Goulet was clear, in Gramscian fashion, that much of what he said—like 
calling for voluntary austerity as the path to freedom—was in one sense 
utopian: ‘one can only be pessimistic’ (1971a: 263). But he saw it also as the 
only realism. He took a long-run perspective, and was resigned to eras of 
conflict, violence and confusion, as inevitable in processes of major change 
(1971a: Ch. 13 and Conclusion). In particular he held that ‘unless the ground 
rules of production and decision-making are profoundly altered within the 
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United States, a world order of authentic development has no chance to be 
born’ (2006a: 90; originally published in 1970). By 1995 he remarked that 
‘Sustainable development, because it is found too difficult, may… remain 
untried’ (2006a: 155). 
In such a historical setting we require not only recognition of the potential 
existential power of ethics, but careful theorization of influence and change.3 
Goulet constantly reiterated, through to perhaps his final published paragraph, 
that “the primary mission of development ethics…is to keep hope alive” 
(Goulet 2006b: 120). How? Three interconnected means are: incorporation of 
ideas in movements, incorporation in methods, and incorporation in education 
and training. Development ethics can seek in these ways to become, in 
Goulet’s key phrase, “the means of the means”, in other words embedded in 
and influencing the means of action: professionals and organisations, 
techniques and procedures, legislatures and courts. It seeks to not merely 
specify goals but to affect the processes and instruments through which the 
goals are, in practice, respecified and marginalised or given real weight. 
Methods of policy analysis 
Goulet’s perspectives did not become sufficiently embodied in methods and 
methodologies. He was aware of the central importance of how routine 
operation is structured, as seen in his work on incentives and indicators (e.g. 
Goulet, 1989, 1992c), but was not fond of formalisms and formalised 
frameworks. He regretted ‘the excessive complexity and heaviness of [Lebret’s] 
methodological instruments’ (Goulet 1974; reprinted at 2006a: 62). Yet 
incorporation into methods is a vital part of institutionalisation, and formal 
methods are often the instruments for influence. Later he acknowledged that 
‘Lebret’s pre-planning studies offer a systematic way to engage in precisely 
such consultation’ as is needed for a community to consider and clarify its 
value options and value choices (Goulet 2000; reprinted at 2006a: 180).  
Various of Goulet’s ideas have become embedded by other authors in 
relevant methodologies. His type of value-focused approach to local 
investigation and action has grown in the work led by Robert Chambers (1997) 
and others. His approach to policy ethics is close to the value-critical policy 
analysis of Martin Rein (1976), Frank Fischer (1995), Ronald Schmidt (2006) 
and others, which has been elaborated and applied quite extensively. His 
rethinking of development cooperation (1971a, Ch.8) has been greatly 
advanced by David Ellerman (2005) amongst others.  
More broadly, UNDP’s Human Development approach and the attempts 
to devise and apply human rights based approaches in development 
programming constitute important progress and suggest some lessons. Recent 
human rights based approaches go beyond listing and affirming human rights 
criteria, to using them to steer each stage of planning and management (see e.g. 
Gready & Ensor 2005). Similarly, the surprising degree of impact of the 
Human Development approach reflects more than a media strategy—the high 
profile launches and accessible form of the Human Development Reports, the 
attention-catching use of summary indicators that reveal more than does GNP 
per capita, and the evocative term ‘Human Development’—significant though 
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those are. It reflects the integrating force of a theoretical perspective—the 
thinking of Sen, Nussbaum and others about capability, and of Haq, Jolly, 
Streeten et al. on human development—that brings a rationale and connection 
across a range of activities: the selection of focus, the language and measures 
for description, the choice of illustrative cases, the identification of alternatives, 
tracing of effects, and evaluation of processes and outcomes (Gasper 2008). 
The human development indicators not only catch attention, but provide a 
route to surfacing and publicly discussing value choices. 
Education and training 
Goulet (1971a: Ch.8) espoused the educational model adopted by Lebret in his 
Paris institute: to train a corps of world developers, using a massive 
multidisciplinary syllabus and a professional code. He was not primarily 
interested in training apparatchiks or academics: ‘the aspiring generalist who 
does not gain his wisdom through the praxis of dialectical historical experience 
is doomed to fail’ (1971a: 330). By ‘generalist’ Goulet appears to have meant 
those in his own mould, ‘the philosopher of development, the specialist of 
generality’ (2006a: 26). This can hardly be the main target-group. 
The largest categories in development ethics education are general citizen 
education—including through popular media—and general school education. 
The UK and Ireland, for example, have made steps in the space opened by 
national curriculum requirements for attention to international relations in 
general studies teaching. In the spaces of university and professional education 
several important alternatives exist. First, the special short course, including 
summer schools; second, the dedicated course within an academic or 
professional training programme; third, incorporation into other courses and 
training. The first two alternatives have the advantage, if the courses are 
optional, of keen minority audiences. They give a place to work with potential 
future key resource persons, and to test and develop ideas which can be used 
to interact with bigger mainstream audiences. But the bigger target is the third 
alternative, incorporation into existing courses of policy analysis and planning, 
economics, public policy, management, social policy, research methodology, 
and indeed any foundation course in sociology, politics, economics, human 
geography or development studies. Those audiences are far larger, and the 
danger otherwise exists—seen sometimes in gender- and race-studies—that 
consciousness-raising with small groups goes hand-in-hand with mistrust and 
increased resistance amongst majorities. Incorporation into existing ‘regular’ 
courses addresses also the central requirements for influence: relating ethics 
ideas to other bodies of knowledge and applying them in working procedures. 
Ethics teaching for not only a sympathetic self-selected minority is not easy to 
make effective and fruitful though. Camacho (2006) illustrates a practical 
approach, of not trying to enforce any one doctrine, but providing a space for 
attention, heightened awareness and joint reflection.  
Social movements and the dynamics of change 
Incorporation of ideas into social movements is typically necessary for major 
social change (Murphy 2005; Krznaric 2007). Work in development ethics has 
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to connect with significant movements, and eventually agencies, if it is to be 
heard, tested, informed, upgraded, accepted and used; and it should study the 
instances of successful connection. Haq’s induction of Sen into his UNDP 
work, for example, was part of the mobilization of a network of networks 
required for the coherence, credibility and communication of the human 
development paradigm. Haq brought together networks of several kinds, each 
necessary: from academe, not least from economics; from within United 
Nations organizations; from wider development organizations, such as the 
Society of International Development and the Third World Forum; plus 
intergovernment networks from his long service as official and Minister 
(Gasper 2007). He further ensured that he could retain unimpeded access to 
them, by obtaining editorial independence for the Human Development 
Report Office. 
While sympathetic to the UNDP-based movement of human 
development and to movements of participatory research and action, Goulet’s 
active affiliation and quest for partners appears to have been especially within 
movements of progressive Christian thinking. Here the 1980s and 1990s were 
often times of retrogression instead. Compared to the 1970s Goulet’s influence 
declined, in the absence of vehicles—organizations, journals, a clearly 
encapsulated methodology, related movements—that could extend, apply and 
adapt his approach. The model of an ethical grandee or Parisian prophet, 
dissemination of whose ideas looks after itself thanks to their power and 
elegance and the presence of a large waiting audience, did not fit. Two of the 
key audiences were too remote, physically or psychologically: movements of 
the poor who lived far away, and the Northern rich, asked to reflect about their 
riches and about their relation to the distant poor.  
Goulet was temperamentally close in some ways to the international 
human rights movement or movements, which has tried to institutionalize 
ideas of great existential power. He had doubts though in the 1980s about its 
generalizing and sometimes rather Eurocentric vision (Goulet 1984). A decade 
later he felt that: ‘The present intellectual climate and the political conjuncture 
are both favorable to a serious discussion of human rights and policies on their 
behalf. But a monumental problem arises: there are too many rights, too many 
competing claims. … Thus the very proliferation of rights and claims is itself 
an obstacle to the implementation of any of them’ (Goulet 1992: 243). Since 
then the human rights movement has continued to spread and gain influence, 
seen for example in campaigns for debt relief and for rights to food, water and 
basic drugs. There are lessons for the rest of development ethics, some 
perhaps sobering, some encouraging. First, the rise of human rights thinking 
especially from the 1940s has not come primarily through ethics conferences, 
or academic activities of any type. It represents a reaction to the experiences of 
totalitarianism in the mid 20th century, as well as a longer history of reactions to 
colonialism and imperialism (Crawford 2002). Also of fundamental importance 
have been the rise of global communications, bringing a spread of images and 
life-stories that contribute to ‘an ethics of recognition’ (Schaffer and Smith 
2004). The lesson would be familiar to Goulet: that much of any pressure 
behind development ethics will be from crises, national and global; and part 
will come from growing interconnection and communication. Development 
17 
ethics then needs, in business language, a communications strategy not limited 
to waiting for leaders of ethical grandeur. 
Second, the significance of human rights thinking is not solely dependent 
on its incorporation in legal systems. Human rights-based approaches now give 
attention to influencing all stages in public policy and management; to action in 
business, civil society, community groups, and everyday life; and to action on 
and through attitudes, and virtues, not only through attempted declaration and 
enforcement of duties. In such ways the approaches have important impact, 
despite the problem of many competing rights-claims. The general lesson for 
development ethics matches Goulet’s central theme: it must present ideas that 
function as ‘the means of the means’, pervading and influencing actual uses of 
the means of action. How should we organise for that intention? 
THE ORGANISATION OF DEVELOPMENT ETHICS: DISCIPLINED 
NON-DISCIPLINARITY 
I suggested that Goulet’s distinctive strengths came through his ethnographic 
and sociological approach, rather than through a rethinking of welfare 
economics or application of Western moral philosophy. His intense exposure 
in a series of small and marginal communities provided profound insights but 
also perhaps a distancing from more abstracted and formal languages. Yet just 
as village ethics cannot suffice for more complex societies, so more elaborated, 
multi-part, dissociated and in some parts abstract, intellectual systems, methods 
and projects are needed in analytical and practical ethics (Gasper 1996). We 
saw that Goulet’s type of work requires partnership with the streams derived 
from economics and philosophical ethics. He sought, and often reached, a 
broad audience, but unless one also reaches relevant specialists then one’s 
impact can be ephemeral. Reaching out to diverse important audiences requires 
diverse tools: sometimes eloquence and profundity, sometimes formalism and 
precision, sometimes standard working procedures, sometimes specific 
personal networks.  
To take forward this work in building a field of development ethics that 
makes some difference, with systematic incorporation of ideas into methods, 
movements and education, what is an appropriate organisational format? 
Goulet argued that a disciplinary or (as an area within philosophical ethics) 
sub-disciplinary format is appropriate. We criticised him for investing too little 
in theoretical system-building. If theoretical deepening and formalisation are 
important, is not a separate (sub-)disciplinary space indeed essential? But the 
need is not for a specialist space within academic philosophy. The analyses 
required lie at the interfaces of different branches of philosophy, social 
sciences, management and humanities, and of academic work and practical 
action. It is important to reach the ‘clerisy’ of specialists, the ‘religious orders’ 
of the modern intellect, but not to create a new such order that will not 
communicate with nor be heard by the existing ones. 
An intellectual area that calls itself development ethics needs instead to 
function like a nursery, cultivating ideas and persons that will be transplanted, 
even if they later remain in touch. The nursery is not the long-term destination; 
such a self-conception would leave it as a minor ghetto. Influence on 
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mainstreams is the objective. The characteristic development ethics perspective 
described earlier—comparative, intercultural, international, interdisciplinary, 
change-oriented and close to practice—implies that a disciplinary nest in which 
restricted and abstracted formulations of issues are pursued in great depth will 
not be ideal. It can form a permanent cocoon from which the fledgling does 
not graduate. 
Goulet called for a form of philosophy which did graduate, into the world 
of action. We saw his advice: “…for moral philosophers to stop ‘moralizing’ 
and undertake serious analysis of ethical problems posed by development, 
underdevelopment, and planning…they must go to the marketplace, the 
factory, the planning board, and the irrigation project and create ethical 
strategies of social decision-making which enter into the dynamics and the 
constraint systems of major policy instruments: political, technical, and 
administrative” (Goulet 1988: 155). He never declared a moral position from 
on high, but based advice on in-situ investigation, as well as a perspective of 
long-term change that had been informed by history, social science, and local 
immersion. Goulet moved beyond only highlighting the normative significance 
and priority of goals and criteria other than economic growth. He showed the 
centrality of such goals in motivating and guiding people’s behaviour; and he 
sought to incorporate justified normative criteria into systems of decision-
making. This moves development ethics’ centre of gravity from philosophy 
towards anthropology, psychology, sociology, economics and management.  
Yet, paradoxically, he called consistently for development ethics to be a 
distinct discipline and specialism, a sort of secular priesthood (e.g., Goulet 
1988, 1997). “The development ethicist” was the protagonist in many of his 
writings, which remained set in the mould of his 1960s and 70s work. The 
envisaged development ethicist was a Goulet, engaged in technical cooperation 
programmes or employed as a specialist researcher and adviser, a worker 
philosopher. He considered it ‘inevitable that a new discipline, based on 
systematic examination—both instrumental and philosophical—of 
comparative values must someday join the ranks of…comparative approaches 
to the study of development’ (2006a: 26, originally written in 1976). In reality 
there has been as much regression as progress in this direction. Goulet’s own 
unusual career could not form a generalisable model.  
Goulet’s insistence on evolution from tradition domestically in each 
country, and on a separate specialism or sub-discipline of ‘development 
ethicists’, who should be added to decision-making in development policy and 
practice, form an uneasy combination. Where would a sub-discipline emerge 
except in North America where philosophical ethics is an enterprise of 
sufficient scale, in terms of numbers of courses and students and academics, 
for such a specialism to receive sustained attention? And what role would such 
implicitly expatriate or relatively distanced ethicists have in relation to domestic 
traditions? Goulet offered a parallel with specialist business and medical ethical 
advisors (1988: 160-2). But those in general live in the same cities as their 
clients. The paths of trying to influence methods, other specialists and social 
movements are more relevant than trying to construct a new specialism or 
movement. To enrich and modify others’ work is more feasible and more 
fruitful. 
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For those working in development ethics, ‘discipline’ is a central concept 
that requires extended examination, just like ‘freedom’ and ‘need’ (see Gasper 
2004 for one attempt). Goulet was aware of pitfalls in disciplinarity, and the 
vested interests of existing disciplinary redoubts that do not let new 
competitors readily emerge. Indeed he was based in a department of 
economics that was ultimately torn apart by conflict between a disciplinary and 
an inter-disciplinary approach to economics. He himself never sought ‘to 
trespass on the proper autonomy of each discipline—which is something other 
than…hermetic closure upon oneself’ (1960, republished at 2006a: 14)—nor 
did he seek ‘to win sectarian or partisan victories’ (p.15). In arguing for 
development ethics as a separate discipline he perhaps though misread the 
challenge. The demands for interdisciplinary communication in development 
ethics are so central, and the demands of interdisciplinary communication so 
considerable, that a disciplinary or sub-disciplinary format does not fit well 
here. 
Attempts to build a sub-discipline in academic philosophy have had slight 
impact. The difficulty to draw clear boundaries for development ethics 
contributes amongst other factors to the non-emergence of a sharply 
distinctive field. If we see development ethics in, for example, Dower’s 
sense—as the field that asks ‘How ought a society to exist and move into the 
future?’—then it cannot be a tidy subdiscipline. Rather it is a concern that 
belongs in many choice arenas. The place for development ethics is as an inter-
disciplinary field in which a variety of relevant disciplines exchange and enrich 
each other (Gasper 1994). Development ethics authors in practice come from 
all backgrounds, not predominantly from philosophy. 
Is such a framing of development ethics as an interdisciplinary meeting 
place, a looser academic and professional forum, truly fruitful as well as more 
feasible? If one is not a discipline – a self-enclosed, self-referential territory 
with one’s own induction and indoctrination, system of rewards and 
punishments, loyalties and captive population, border controls and flag – can 
one achieve and maintain the focus, continuity, and critical mass needed for 
deep intellectual work? Truong and I suggest that in fact most of the areas of 
creativity and energy in development ethics lie at intersection points between a 
stream of practice—whether economic policy, human rights activism, 
emergency relief, business management or whatever—and a stream of ethically 
sensitive theorizing, whether from socio-economics, quality of life studies, 
religions, feminisms, jurisprudence, or so on (Gasper & Truong 2005). There 
are multiple linked sites of such conversations. Development ethics includes 
and interconnects these sites. To do this it has various ‘nursery’ functions: in 
shared conceptualisation, cross-fertilisation, education and training. These need 
a long-term institutional base of professional groups and associations, 
textbooks, journals, even traditions. But since the primary task is one of 
reaching out, and of connecting diverse other streams of theory and practice, it 
is more realistic and accurate to describe the resulting field as one of 
interdisciplinary interaction rather than as a new discipline. We see this 
principle largely at work in the Human Development and Capability 
Association, and in the change of subtitle of the Journal of Human Development 
from ‘Alternative Economics in Action’ to ‘A Multi-Disciplinary Journal for 
People-Centred Development’.  
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In his late work Goulet recognised “two different roads” for development 
ethics (1997: 1166). The first was his own model, of “a new discipline with 
distinctive methods and research procedures” (loc. cit.). The second road was 
of development ethics as a type of work that overlaps with other types, with 
which it cooperates as partners in interdisciplinary activity. While Goulet still 
saw prospects in the former, he had become aware of the alternative model of 
inter-disciplinary learning (Goulet 1992b). This path has been followed much 
more. An important number of development practitioners and social scientists 
have become more self-consciously and systematically ethics-oriented, for 
example through the spread of rights-based approaches and of human 
development perspectives. The required investigation in the marketplace, 
factory, planning board, and irrigation project has been done not by 
philosophers, but by ethically aware anthropologists, economists, geographers, 
health specialists, journalists, planners, political scientists and others. In his 
final book Goulet continued to talk of using findings from ‘other disciplines’ 
(p.xxxiii), as if development ethics was a comparable discipline. But he 
recognised development ethics ‘as an intrinsically interdisciplinary effort’ 
(2006a: xxxii), and spoke of ‘discipline’ often now simply in the everyday sense, 
as a disciplined activity—‘systematic, cumulative, communicable, and testable’ 
(loc. cit.).  
Goulet was determined not ‘to pursue a vision of justice shrouded in a 
Utopian halo because it is not deeply imbedded in the world of real 
constraints’ (2006a: 3). In the same spirit I have tried to draw lessons from his 
remarkable career, for ongoing work on human development and development 
ethics. 
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NOTES 
 
1 Appendix 3 to The Cruel Choice outlined its four stages. The approach is similar to 
the 'Verbal Image' form of reporting presented by Howard Richards (1985), that aims 
to give a broad picture, a description and understanding of how a program works in 
its societal context, not a focus only on a few aspects taken out of their context. It 
tries to ensure coverage of non-measurable impacts, and to grasp the human meanings 
in situations and make sense, to outsiders and insiders, of what has happened; and to 
have insiders systematically check the ‘verbal image’ that is constructed on the basis of 
their contributions. See Richards, pp.79-85; Lee & Shute (1991). 
2 Thus the important 1976 presentations that form Chs. 3 and 4 of his 2006 book were 
not extended to relate to the wealth of relevant material from contemporary social 
science and philosophy. 
3 See Gasper (2006) for a complementary discussion of these themes. 
